Interests prices and the Barosky - Summers resolution of the Gibson paradox under the gold standard

This paper presents a structural monetary úamework featunng a demand function for non-monetary uses of gold, such as the one drawn by Barsky and Summers in their 1988 analy8ÚI of the Gibson Paradox as a natural concomitant of the gold standard period. That structural model predicts that the laws of behavior of nominal prices and interest rates are functions of the rules set by the government to command the money supply. !ta fiduciary vemon obtaina Fisherian relationships &8 particular cases. !ta gold atandard 801ution yields a modelsimilar to the Barsky and Summers model, in which interest rates are exogeneous and subject to shocb. This paper integrates governnment bonds into the analysis, treats interest rates endogenously, and ahifts the responsibility for the shocb to the government budgetary financing policies. The Gibson paradox appears as "practically" the only cl&18 of behavioral pattern open for interest rates and price movements under apure gold standard economy. Fisherian-like relationshipe are utterly ruled out.

Economic recovery from the Argentine great depression : institutions, expectations, and the change of macroeconomic regime

This work explores how Argentina overcame the Great Depression and asks whether active macroeconomic interventions made any contribution to the recovery. In particular, we study Argentine macroeconomic policy as it deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. As elsewhere, fiscal policy in Argentina was conservative, and had little power to smooth output. Monetary policy became heterodox after 1929. The first and most important stage of institutional change took place with the switch from a metallic monetary regime to a fiduciary regime in 1931; the Caja de Conversión (Conversion Office, a currency board) began rediscounting as a means to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflationary pressures, thus breaking from orthodox "mIes of the game." However, the actual injections of liquidity were small' and were not enough to fully offset the incipient monetary contractions: the "Keynes" effect was weak or negative. Rather, recovery derived from changes in beliefs and expectations surrounding the shift in the monetary and exchange-rate regime,and the delinking of gold flows and the money base. Agents perceivod a new regime, as shown by the path of consumption, investment, and estimated ex ante real interest rates: the "Mundell" effect was dominant. Notably, this change of regime predated a later, and supposedly more significant, stage of institutional reform, namely the creation of the central bank in 1935. Still, the extent of intervention was weak, and insufficient to fully offset externaI shocks to prices and money. Argentine macropolicy was heterodox in terms of the change of regime, but still conservative in terms of the tentative scope of the measures taken .

O “elo perdido” entre a organização mundial do comércio e o fundo monetário internacional

One of the main objectives of the Bretton Woods negotiations was to guarantee the firm control over competitive exchange rate devaluations, which had worsened the effects of the economic crisis of the 1930s. The par value exchange rate system was thus created, representing a link between the international financial system and the international trading system, guaranteeing, to the latter, the neutrality of the currency issue. The present article analyses how the institutional revolutions suffered by the IMF ended up representing the loss of this link and discusses its consequences to the WTO